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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the evidence introduced at trial present an

issue of fact as to whether the Plaintiff's

failure to

return the executed installment contract and down payment
within a reasonable time constituted a breach of the settlement

agreement

entered

into

by

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

precluding the Court from ruling as a matter of law that
Defendant breached the settlement agreement by entering a
default judgment?
2.

Was

jury

instruction

No. 3 as to damages

for

Defendant's wrongful entry of a default judgment based upon
a conclusion not dictated by the evidence and therefore
prejudicial to Defendant?
3.

Is it necessary for Plaintiff to show malice in

fact in order to recover punitive damages for a claim of
abuse of process?
4.

Is the award of compensatory damages in the amount

of $250.00 and the award of punitive damages in the amount
of $37,000.00 so grossly disproportionate that it cannot be
sustained as a matter of law?
5.

Did the District Court err when it denied Defen-

dant's Motion for Remitittur of the award which Defendant
argued was unsupported by facts in evidence sufficient to
establish

Defendant's

malice

and

unsupported

by

the

controlling law as to the appropriateness of the punitive
damages?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October, 1983, Plaintiff purchased from Defendant a
video game to be placed in Plaintiff's arcade in Box Elder
County.

(Tr. 6)

In early November,

1983, Plaintiff in-

formed Mr. Merlin Symes, Defendant's manager, that the game _
was not performing to his expectations and asked permission-^
to return it to Defendant.

Defendant's manager refused to

accept return of the game.

(Tr. 8-9, 74)

Plaintiff there-

after refused to make further payments and Defendant filed
suit against Plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit Court, Murray
Department, in February, 1984, to recover from Plaintiff the
purchase price of the video game.

(Tr. 10, 87-88)

Plaintiff's receipt of the summons and complaint,

Upon

Plaintiff

contacted Defendant's manager by telephone for the purpose ^
of negotiating a settlement of the dispute.
79)

(Tr. 10, 7 7>--gc

The parties orally agreed that Plaintiff would execute

an installment

purchase

contract

for the purchase

of the

video game and make a down payment of $500.00 and Defendant
would dismiss the pending law suit and accept payment under
the

installment

claims.

purchase

(Tr. 11, 79-80)

contract

in

settlement

of

Defendant's manager agreed

its
that

Plaintiff would not be required to respond to the complaint
filed in the Murray Department of the Fifth Circuit Court
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and

Defendant

would

dismiss

receipt of the executed
thereunder.

(Tr. 11, 79)

the

action

upon

Defendant's

contract and the initial payment
The contract was prepared by the

Defendant and sent to Plaintiff for execution within four or
five days of the telephone conversation.
On or

about

March

Kingston, contacted
settled

the

4, 1984, Defendant's

Defendant

account

or

(Tr. 11, 80)

if

and

a

asked

Default

counsel, C.

if Plaintiff had

Judgment

should

entered as no response had been made to the Complaint.
95)

be
(Tr.

C. Kingston was advised that the contract for install-

ment purchase of the video game had been sent to Plaintiff
for his execution but that Plaintiff had not returned it and
had made no payments, and that C. Kingston should proceed to
take judgment.
prepare

(Tr. 96)

a Default

Defendant's counsel proceeded to

Judgment

and

forward

it to the Murray

Circuit Court on March 14, 1984, where it was entered on
March 20, 1984.

(Tr. 29, 88)

A copy of the judgment was

docketed in Box Elder County on April 16, 1984.

(Tr. 29,

88)
A

Motion

and

Order

in

Supplemental

Proceedings

was

issued and served upon the Plaintiff on or about the 1st day
of May, 1984.

(Tr. 13-14, 88; Exhibit No. 2)

In the interim between counsel for Defendant's inquiry
as

to

default

the

status

judgment,

of

the payments

Defendant

and

received

-3-

the
a

entry

check

of
and

the
the

executed contract from Plaintiff.
1)

(Tr. 12-13; Exhibit No.

The check and contract were dated February 27, 1984, but

were received by Defendant on March 15, 1984.
Plaintiff telephoned

(Tr. 80-81)

C. Kingston upon service of the

Order in Supplemental Proceedings, on or about May 4, 1984,
and told him that he had made arrangements with the Defendant

for

payment

of

the

amount

due.

(Tr.

15,

89)

C. _

Kingston contacted Defendant and was told that Plaintiff was:t:
making monthly payments and that further collection action *should

be

suspended

until

C.

Kingston

was

notified.

C.

Kingston was not told that Plaintiff had signed a contract.
(Tr. 83, 89, 91, 94, 95)
tiff

that

he

need

not

C. Kingston then informed Plainappear

Supplemental Proceedings.
In January,
business
learned

debt
from

Defendant's

Court

on

the

Order

in

(Tr. 15)

1985, Plaintiff undertook to refinance a

secured

by

a mortgage

representatives
judgment

(Tr. 16, 90)

in

of

First

constituted

a

Plaintiff contacted

(C. Kingston) in January, 1985,

on

a

residence

Security

lien

on his

Bank

and&Hr
thatafe

property.

the Defendant's

counsel

(Tr. 90) and requested that

the judgment be released, asserting that all payments on the
account had been made.
1985, Kingston
Plaintiff's

(Tr. 16)

contacted

payments

were

Defendant
not

On or about January 10,
and

current

was

informed

(Tr. 83, 91), and

Defendant requested that collection action be pursued.
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that

C.

Kingston
would

informed

not

advised

be

set

Plaintiff

by

aside.

letter

(Tr.

that he was delinquent

account in favor of Defendant.

92)

that

the

judgment

Plaintiff

in payments

was

also

upon an open

(Tr. 17, 92; Exhibit No. 3)

Accordingly, a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings
was issued on February 27, 1985.

(Tr. 18-19; Exhibit No. 4)

Despite the existence of the lien against Plaintiff's
residential

property,

First

Security

Bank

accepted

the

property as security and increased the principal amount of
Plaintiff's loan with no increase in the rate of interest.
(Tr. 44)
Thereafter, Plaintiff retained an attorney to contact
Defendant.

(Tr. 19)

Plaintiff's attorney

requested

that

the judgment be set aside based upon the prior settlement
which had been negotiated
Exhibit No. 5)
Plaintiff

had

between

the parties.

(Tr. 91;

Plaintiff's counsel further asserted
performed

according

to

the

terms

of

that
the

purchase contract which had been negotiated as part of that
settlement.

(Exhibit No. 5)

C. Kingston inquired of Defendant and learned of the
contract

signed

by Plaintiff.

He responded

by

letter to

Plaintiff's attorney dated March, 1985, (Tr. 91; Exhibit No.
6) that the contract may have been a satisfaction of the
account

sued upon originally, and

that he would

Order in Supplemental Proceedings stricken.
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have the

(Tr. 92,99)

On March

27, 1985, C. Kingston

further

responded

to

Plaintiff's demand that judgment be released by preparing a
Satisfaction

of

Judgment

and

by

personally

obtaining

the

Court's signature on an Order for Vacation of the Judgment
in the original case filed in the Fifth Circuit Court, and
forwarding the same for entry.
No. 12)

(Transcript 29, 100; Exhibit

C. Kingston also informed Plaintiff's counsel thati^

the default judgment had been prepared based on his informate
mation

that

contract nor

Defendant

had

received

the payment which

(Tr. 96-97; Exhibit No. 7)

neither

Plaintiff

the

agreed

executed J
to make.

Kingston denied that any malice

or wrongful intent to injure the Plaintiff had been involved
in his entry of the Default Judgment, but that such had been
done due to the fact that Plaintiff had

failed

with the terms of the settlement as negotiated.

to comply
(Tr. 85,

102)

'..-ite.
Plaintiff filed an action in the District Court of Boxife

Elder County claiming abuse of process and malicious breach
of contract, and

prayed

for actual and punitive damages.

During the course of the trial, Plaintiff stipulated that as
of July 10, 1986, he was indebted to Defendant in the sum of
$1,493.98 on the agreement for sale of the video equipment
and $775.00 on an open account.
The

District

Court

ruled

(Tr. 25)
as

a

matter

Defendant breached the settlement agreement.
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of

law

that

(R. 165, 102)

The jury then found that Plaintiff suffered actual damages
in the amount of $250.00, the sum claimed as attorneyfs fees
paid by the Plaintiff to his lawyer to have the judgment
previously entered in the Fifth Circuit Court and docketed
in Box Elder County set aside.
45)

The

jury

also

found

(R. 165, 125-126; Tr. 34,

that

Defendant's

conduct

was

malicious and awarded $37,000.00 as punitive damages against
Defendant.

(R. 165, 125-126)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The evidence before the Trial Court presented an issue
of fact as to whether the Plaintiff's failure to return the
executed

installment

reasonable

time

contract

constituted

and
a

down

breach

payment
of

the

within

a

settlement

agreement by Plaintiff that precluded a ruling as a matter
of law that it was Defendant who breached

the settlement

agreement by obtaining a default judgment against Plaintiff.
Where the Trial Court invades the jury's province by directing a verdict on such an issue and there is a substantial
dispute in the evidence, this Court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
verdict is directed and may refuse to sustain the verdict
where there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict in
favor

of

sufficient

the

losing

evidence

party.
to

Defendant

support

-7-

a

believes

verdict

that

there
it

is
was

Plaintiff who breached the settlement agreement and that the
directed verdict in Plaintiff's favor was reversible error.
The Trial Court's explanation of Defendant's breach was
contained
jury

in Jury

only

the

Defendant's

Instruction No. 3 and

questions

counsel

of

malice

objected

to

and

that

submitted

to the

damages.

Where

Instruction

as

not

dictated by the evidence and prejudicial to Defendant, this4^
Court

may

review

the

appropriateness

of the

instruction.^

Defendant believes that the giving of Instruction No. 3 was
reversible

error

because

Defendant

might

have obtained

a

more favorable result absent the error.
The Trial Court also failed
malice in fact as a threshold

to require a finding of

for Plaintiff's recovery of

punitive damages for abuse of process.

Defendant urges this

Court to find that punitive damages for abuse of process are
available

only

in

more

previously been held
wrongful
malice

fact by

circumstances,

as

hasv.m

for claims of false imprisonment and;^

attachment.

in

restricted

The

record

the Defendant

contains
to

no evidence

support

an

award

of
of

punitive damages.
Should
awarded

on

this Court
the

decide

appropriate

that punitive

legal

standard

damages
and

that

were
the

record contains sufficient evidence of malice in fact, the
award of punitive damages 148 times the amount of compensatory

damages

is

grossly

disproportionate,

-8-

inconsistent

v/ith recent decisions and cannot be sustained as a matter of
law.
The

Trial

Court

denied

Defendant's

Motion

for

Remitittur or in the Alternative New Trial, even though the
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was far in excess
of those which this Court had previously refused to sustain.
Furthermore, the amount set by the jury is without factual
basis and because so disproportionate must be the product of
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.

Defendant

believes that the denial of Remitittur was erroneous.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT TO THE JURY
THE ISSUE OF WHICH PARTY BREACHED THE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THAT
ISSUE AND WAS ERRONEOUS.
Evidence presented at the trial of this matter established that the installment contract (Exhibit No. 1) was an
enforceable contract, drafted by the Defendant and signed by
the Plaintiff.

Performance according to the terms of the

contract

constitute

would

a

settlement

of

the

pending

lawsuit which had been brought by the Defendant in the Fifth
Circuit Court to obtain amounts due from Plaintiff for the
purchase of video equipment.

(Tr. 11-15, 80, 95)
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Testimony of the Plaintiff and of Defendant's attorney,
C. Kingston, addressed the issue of whether Plaintiff timely
performed

by executing

the contract

payment of Five Hundred Dollars
tiff's

and mailing

the down

($500) as agreed.

testimony, however, was ambiguous

Plain-

as to the dates

when the contract was received by Plaintiff and returned to
Defendant.

(Tr. 11-12)

Plaintiff could only testify that -.

the contract was dated February 27, 1984. (Tr. 12)

«

Defendant's division manager testified that he had come ~
to an agreement with Plaintiff

(Tr. 79) , that the contract

was sent out for signature in the last part of February of
1984, (Tr. 79-80) and that a copy of the signed contract was
back in the possession of the Defendant on March 15, 1984.
(Tr.

81)

Defendant's

attorney,

C.

Kingston,

prepared

a

Default Judgment and sent it to the Fifth Circuit Court for
entry

on

the

14th

day

of March,

1984,

(Tr. 88)

and

he rat

learned of the existence of the contract executed in settlement of the Defendant's
When C. Kingston
promptly

acted

learned

claims in March, 1985.
of this settlement

(Tr. 91)

agreement

upon that knowledge by preparing

he

a Satis-

faction of Judgment and by obtaining the signature of the
Court on an Order to Vacate the judgment obtained
Fifth Circuit Court
ract constituted

in the

(Tr. 100) on the ground that the cont-

an accord and satisfaction of Defendant's

original claim against Plaintiff.
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Plaintiff VanDyke's claim is that Defendant breached
the settlement agreement by obtaining a Default Judgment in
the Fifth Circuit Court.
the date

on

the

Defendant claims that (1) despite

contract

itself, it was

Plaintiff who

breached by failing to timely comply with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement; (2)

that Defendant did not have the

signed contract and down payment in its possession until
March 15, 1984; (3)

that its counsel, C. Kingston, made

inquiries of Defendant and was informed that Defendant had
not received the executed contract and down payment from
Plaintiff as required by the settlement agreement and that
the Default Judgment was submitted to the Murray Circuit
Court

on March

14, 1984, in

the

ordinary

course

when

Plaintiff failed to answer the complaint filed against him
or to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement.
Defendant

contends

that

the

testimony

cited

above

presented an issue of fact as to whether or not the settlement agreement was breached and by which party, which issue
was a proper one for the jury.

Instead, the Court ruled

that the Defendant had breached the agreement as a matter of
law and submitted to the jury only the question of damages.
The District Court's explanation of Interrogatory No.
I, Instruction No. 3, contains the following language:
[T]he Court also finds that the Contract and
Five Hundred Dollar ($500) payment was made before
the Default Judgment and/or filed the judgment in
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Box Elder County. [sic]
This was a breach of
contract regardless of whether it was done intentionally or in oversight. The Plaintiff is entitled
to his damages reasonably incurred in removing
that judgment . . . .
(R. 103)

Defendant believes the Court's failure to submit

the question to the jury constituted a directed verdict and
was erroneous under the circumstances.
Recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have defined
4..

the principles of law relevant to a directed verdict.

Where

a motion for directed verdict is made, all evidence must be
considered by the trial court in the light most favorable to
the party against whom it is directed.

Cerritos Trucking

Co. v. Utah Venture No. lf 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982) .
there

is any

substantial dispute

in the evidence, a case

should not be taken from the jury.
P. 2d at 611.

Where

Cerritos Trucking, 645

Furthermore:

This Court's standard of review of a directed
verdict is the same as that imposed upon the trial
Court. We must examine the evidence in the light
most favorable to the losing party, and if there
is a reasonable basis in the evidence and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing party,
the directed verdict can not be sustained.

,:

Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homowners Assoc, v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982).
The

portions

of

the

testimony

cited

above

are

in-

dicative of the conflictive evidence surrounding the events
of

February

and

March,

1984,
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and

the

necessity

for

a

determination by the fact finding body of whether it was
Plaintiff,

Defendant

constituted

a breach of the settlement agreement.

issue

is

Defendant

the

or

threshold

respectfully

both

for
urges

parties

all

of

the

whose

conduct
This

Plaintiff's claims.

Court

to

examine

the

evidence and reverse the directed verdict on this issue.

POINT II
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 WHICH SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
ONLY THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES WAS ERRONEOUS AND
PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.
Defendant is aware that the accepted rules of appellate
review preclude

the Supreme Court

from substituting its

judgment for that of a jury on issues of fact, unless the
evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the appellant
that reasonable people would not differ on the outcome of
the case.

E.A. Strout Western Realty v. VhC. Foy & Sons,

Inc. , 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).

Defendant is also aware

that a party must preserve exceptions to particular jury
instructions

by

timely

objections.

E.A.

Strout

Western

Realty, 665 P.2d at 1322.
It is Defendant's position that Interrogatories Nos. I
and III of Jury Instruction No. 3 were given after the Court
had directed a verdict on the issue of Defendant's breach of
the settlement agreement.

Jurors were not given the oppor-

tunity to determine whether Defendant's conduct was actually

-13-

in violation of the terms of the agreement, but only the
presence of malice and the amount of damages to be awarded
to

the

Plaintiff.

(R.

102-103;

counsel objected

to the explanation

(Tr.

contained

128)

which

the

105-106)
to

Defendant's

Instruction No. 3

District

Court f s

directed

verdict and consequent intrusion upon the jury's province.
Defendant asserts that the District Court f s instruction
was erroneous and prejudicial because it presumed a breach
by Defendant and dictated an award of damages.

That verdict**^

was based on conflicting evidence and, hence, was erroneous;
the

instruction

Defendant

urges

as
the

to

damages

Court

was,

to

find

hence,
this

prejudicial.

combination

of

directed verdict and instruction reversible error.
This Court has previously

found an instruction to be

erroneous in a case in which the jury had been instructed
that the driver of a vehicle was negligent as a matter of „
law and that the jury could conclude that his negligence w a s ^
the sole proximate cause of a collision.
case,

the

disputed

instruction

was

"In the present

erroneous

because

it

failed to submit the proximate cause issue to the jury for
determination.11

Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P. 2d

217, 220 (Utah 1983).

The Court continued:

We do not mean to imply that rulings by the
Trial Court which decide a factual contention as a
matter of law are never appropriate.
But the
right to trial by jury is a basic principal of our
system that can not be allowed to be eroded by
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improper intrusions on the jury's prerogative. . . .
Id.
The Court's second

inquiry in Harris was whether the

errors were sufficiently prejudicial to constitute grounds
for reversal.

"An error is reversible if there is a reason-

able likelihood that a more favorable result would have been
obtained
error."
The

by

the complaining party

in the

absence

of the

Harris, 671 P.2d at 222.
present

case

presents

similar to those of Harris.

a

combination

of

errors

Defendant believe that, absent

the errors, the jury might have released it from any liability at all for this incident.

According to the standards

set forth in Harris, such errors are grounds for reversal.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW
WHEN IT DID NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF MALICE IN
FACT AS A BASIS FOR THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS.
This Court need not accord its typical difference to
the judgment of the trial court where principles of law have
been misapplied.
1984) .

Jeppson vs. Jeppson, 684 P. 2d 69

(Utah

Defendant contends that punitive damages for abuse

of process require a showing of actual malice and that the
District Court did not sufficiently articulate the standard
for a determination of damages.

-15-

Two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions have addressed
the appropriateness of punitive damages where process has
been wrongfully used.

First, in an action for damages due

to wrongful attachment, the Court held that punitive damages
might be awarded where the violation of rights was found to
be willful and malicious.

First Security Bank of Utah v. J.

B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
In this case, the finding of actual malice
upon which the lower court based its punitive
damages award was not derived from direct evidence
concerning the state of mind of Plaintiff's
officers, but rather was inferred from Plaintiff's
wrongful actions. Such evidence, while sufficient
to sustain the finding of the trial court, does
not show a vindictivness or ill will so extreme as
to warrant the vast sum awarded here, which is
many times greater than the punitive damages
awards in any of the cases cited by intervenor.
First Security Bank 653 P.2d at 599.
Second, in McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., the
"%iy

court declared that the appropriate standard for determining^
W

the availability of punitive damages in an action for false <~
imprisonment is that of "malice in fact" and not malice
implied by law.

678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Defendant urges the Court to make clear that abuse of
process, like false imprisonment and wrongful attachment, is
an action in which a claim is made that correct procedures
have been misused for ulterior and wrongful purposes, and
that actual malice must be shown to support an award of

-16-

punitive damages.

Such a requirement was imposed

by the

Supreme Court of Northa Dakota:
[A]n abuse of process can occur only when the
facts
[sic] constituting the abuse are done
willfully.
If the acts are done maliciously,
exemplary damages can also be sought, but willfulness is the basic requirement. A person is liable
for an abuse of process if he knowingly participates in the abuse of process.
Good faith,
however, is a defense.
A & A Metal Bldgs. v. I-S, Inc., 274 N.W. 2d 183, 187 (North
Dakota 1978).
A review of the record makes clear that there was no
showing of actual malice.

For example, C. Kingston testi-

fied that neither he nor the Defendant had any purpose in
obtaining

the

Default

Judgment

other

than

to

reduce

to

judgment the amount owed to Defendant by Plaintiff for the
purchase of video equipment. (Tr. 101-102).
substantially the same testimony.
it

became

apparent
the

to

(Tr. 85) .

C. Kingston

Fifth

Circuit

Mr. Symes gave

that
Court

an

In fact, when
agreement

settlement

of

action

negotiated

between Plaintiff and Defendant, his

had

in

been

immediate

response was to prepare documents to have that judgment set
aside.

(Tr.

106).

Such

actions

in

good

faith

negate

allegations of malice.
In Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, this Court concluded:
[T]he essence of that cause of action [for
abuse of process] is a perversion of the process
to accomplish some improper purpose, such as
compelling its victim to do something which he
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would not otherwise be legally obliged to do. On
the other hand if it is used for its proper and
intended purpose, the mere fact that it has some
other collateral effect does not constitute abuse
of process. As specifically applicable here, this
is so even though it may incidentally and indirectly exert pressure for the collection of a
debt.
519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1974).
legitimately

Accordingly, a creditor may

pursue its remedies for unpaid obligations.

The incidental pressure for collection of a debt does not^-,
even constitute an abuse of process; certainly it does not
rise to the level of malicious conduct.
Defendant's conduct toward Plaintiff was only that of a
creditor seeking to collect amounts admittedly due.

Surely

there is not sufficient evidence of actual hatred, ill will
or vindictiveness in the record to reach the threshold for
an award of punitive damages.

Defendant alleges that by

failing to require the appropriate showing of malice for
punitive damages for abuse of process, the District Court ; &
misapplied principles of law and its decision may be r e - ^
versed.

POINT IV
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND SO GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO
THE PLAINTIFF'S ACTUAL DAMAGES THAT, AS A MATTER
OF LAW, IT CAN NOT BE SUSTAINED.

-18-

On several recent occasions this Court has considered
the propriety of punitive damage awards and has set forth
the following factors for the fact finder's consideration:
1.

The nature of the alleged misconduct of the Defen-

2.

The extent of the effect of the misconduct on the

dant;

lives of the Plaintiff and others;
3.

The

probability

of

future

recurrences

of

such

misconduct;
4.

The relationship between the parties;

5.

The relative wealth of the Defendant;

6.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the miscon-

7.

The amount of actual damages awarded.

duct;

First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591,
598 (Utah 1982).
Defendant contends that the facts presented at trial,
when viewed in relation to the factors set forth above, do
not justify an award of punitive damages.

Although it is

claimed that Defendant failed to release a lien on Plaintiff's investment property, the jury was convinced that the
effect of that alleged misconduct was limited

to actual

damages in the amount of $250.00 for attorney's fees.

There

is very little probability that such conduct will recur due
to

that

fact

that

(1)

these
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circumstances

involved

a

Plaintiff who was admittedly indebted to Defendant, and (2)
the

events

conduct

of

are

attributable,

the

Plaintiff

at

himself.

least

in

The

part,

final

to

the

factor

in-

dicates that this Court will consider whether the amount of
actual

damages

damages.

incurred

justifies

an

award

of

punitive

Defendant believes that actual damages of $250.00

do not dictate an award of punitive damages in any amount.

~

Should it be determined, however, that punitive damages^
are warranted, Bundy v. Century Equipment Co. requires that
"[a]

punitive

damages

award

must

bear

some

reasonable

relation to the actual damages." 692 P. 2d 754, 760
1984) .

(Utah

With regard to the relation of actual to punitive

damages, this Court found Bundy 1 s award of Two Thousand One
Hundred
Twenty

Thirty-Three
Five

Thousand

Dollars

($2,133)

compensatory

Dollars

($25,000)

punitive

(1:12) grossly disproportionate.

and

damages

In Synergetics v. Marathon

Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P. 2d 1106 (Utah 1985), an award

of«

Four Hundred Fifty Two Thousand Dollars ($452,000) compensatory and Two Hundred
damages was
P. 2d

723

Thousand

Dollars

($200,000) punitive

"not excessive"; but in Cruz v. Montoya, 660

(Utah

1983), where compensatory

damages of Nine

Thousand Five Hundred Seventy-Nine Dollars and Eighty-nine
Cents ($9,579.89) were awarded, punitives of Twelve Thousand
Dollars ($12,000) were reduced by this Court to Six Thousand
Dollars

($6,000).

-20-

As a general rule, a reviewing Court will defer to a
jury determination unless the verdict is so excessive as to
shock the conscience and clearly indicate passion, prejudice
or corruption on the part of the jury,

Cruz v. Montoya, 660

P.2d at 726. Moreover, this Court has stated:
[W]hen [an exemplary damages award] is so flagrantly
excessive and unjust as to indicate a disregard of
the rules of law by which damages are regulated,
it is then subject to review and correction as a
matter of law.
First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591,
599 (Utah 1982) (quoting Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258,
629 P. 1008 (Utah 1928)).
The jury awarded the Plaintiff in this matter the sum
of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250), which amount the jury
believed to be the total of Plaintiff's actual damages from
Defendant's
awarded

conduct.

(R.

165)

in the amount of Thirty

Punitive

damages

Seven Thousand

were

Dollars

($37,000), one hundred forty eight (148) times the amount of
the compensatory damages

(R. 165).

Such disproportion is

not based on the evidence and can only be attributed to
passion and prejudice.

Defendant urges the court to direct

the trial court to reduce the excessive damage award.
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POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS DENIAL OF REMITTITUR.
Defendant's Memorandum

in Support

of

its Motion

for

Remittitur attacked the jury's award of punitive damages as
unsupported

by

the evidence

and

grossly

disproportionate.

In light of the precedents cited above and in Defendant's
Memorandum, the award herein of punitive damages One Hundred ,,.
Forty

Eight

damages

is

(14 8)

times

grossly

the

amount

of

disproportionate.

the
Bundy

Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).

compensatory r
v.

Century r>

Furthermore, there

is insufficient evidence in the record of vindictiveness or
ill will

to warrant

such a large award.

Bank v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d
Consequently,

the

Court's

denial

erroneous.

-22-

of

First
591

Security

(Utah 1982).

Remitittur

was

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the precedents cited above and the
record submitted herein, Defendant respectfully urges this
Court to declare that punitive damages for abuse of process
require

a

showing

of actual malice, and

to direct the

District Court to reduce the excessive award of punitive
damages or, in the alternative, to remand for a finding of
fact on the issues of breach of the settlement agreement and
the presence of malice in the conduct of Defendant,
Respectfully submitted,
POOLE, CANNON & SMITH

Dennis K. Poole

Marily^jn P. Fineshriber

-23-

ADDENDUM

INSTRUCTION NO. 3

In this case the Jury will not render a General Verdict as is
sometimes done.

It is your function to answer certain interrogatories,

that is questions.

When you answer the questions the parties will then

make the needed calculations and enter a legal judgment.
The burden of proof by a preponderence of evidence is on the
side contending the answer should be "YES".

If the evidence does

not preponder in the "YES" favor or is evenly balanced, or favor
a "NO" answer the answer should be "NO".

"*~

If the question requires the fixing of a damaged figure, the

]:m

plaintiff must prove such damages by a preponderence of the events,^
that he is entitled to the sum awarded or no sum may be awarded.
INTERROGATORIES I
1.

WHAT SUM DO YOU FIND PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS
• COMPENSATION DAMAGES FOR THE DEFENDANT'S WRONGFUL
ENTRY OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND/OR
IN FILING OF A JUDGMENT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY THAT LIENNED
• THE PLAINTIFF'S REAL PROPERTY?
AWARDED

Explanation:

m

«--

_.

The law anticipates that the Judge will

simplify the issues so far as practical.

If the parties agree

on the issue, the court generally has accepted the agreement.

If

the evidence is not in conflict, so that the reasonable minds of
jurors could not disagree, the court will not submit the issue
but will assume the jury has already ruled in conformance with the
evidence.

-24-

102

-2In this case the Judge has ruled that the parties signed a
legally enforceable contract "Exhibit No. 1".

The defendant

agreed he would abandon his claim for the original purchase price
in the law suit that he had filed in the Circuit Court in Murray,
Utah.

The plaintiff agreed that he would make a $500.00 down payment

and then time payments.

Neither side has abandoned that contract.

The court finds that the parties agree the plaintiff still owes
certain sums on that contract.

The court will enter a judgment on

that portion of the claim in the defendant's favor together with
the sum still owed on the open account.

The court also finds that

the contract and $500.00 payment was made before the default judgment
and/or filed the judgment in Box Elder County.

This was a breach

of contract regardless of whether it was done intentionally or in
oversight.

The plaintiff is entitled to his damages reasonably

incurred in removing that judgment.
certain sums in attorney's fees.

The plaintiff contends he paid

Defendant contends this was not

necessary because they would and did remove it when called to their
attention.

The court submits that issue to the jury for determination.

There has been some evidence received concerning whether or not
the plaintiff paid additional interest, etc., or had other out of
pocket expenses.

The court rules the interest return would not change

(prime plus 3) and the bank never restricted payments on the principal;
therefore the court rules there is no substantial evidence of any
expense other then possible attorney's fees.
This question concerns only compensation damages and does not
concern possible punitive damages.

Punitive damages are addressed

in other interrogatories.
,
1.

INTERROGATORY NO. II

DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT IN THE TAKING OF
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND/OR FILING THE JUDGMENT IN BOX
ELDER COUNTY WAS AN INTENTIONAL BREACH OF CONTRACT DONE

-25-

m::-

-3WITH MALICE OR TO GAIN AN UNLAWFUL ADVANTAGE OVER THE
PLAINTIFF?
"YES"
"NO"
Explanation:

The general rule is that only compensation damages

dan be awarded for a breach of contract, there is an exception in
law to this rule.

An exception exists when a person knowingly and

intentionally breaches the contract with malice.

Malice is present""

if the motive for the breach of contract is spite, hatred, an intent
to inflict emotional stress or suffering, or when it is done to
gain an illegal advantage.

Only if a breach of contract is accompanied

by malice may a punitive judgment be awarded.

No punitive damage

can be awarded against a person for breach of contract who acts in
good faith even though his actions might be negligent or careless
so as to subject him to compendation damages.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendant employee and/or lawyer
knew they had no right to pursue the default judgment or to file the
judgment in Box Elder County when they did it or delay removing it.
The plaintiff alleges that the motive for such action was malice,
spite, hatred and intent to inflict pain or to take an illegal

410

"

'^'

advantage over the plaintiff by unlawfully liening his home and
real property so as to force payment on the new contract and/or the
open account.

The defendant denies this allegation and alleges the

action was a result of an honest mistake that does not exponse them
to punitive damages.
The burden of prooof is on the plaintiff to prove an intentional,
malicious, wrong.
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INTERROGATORY NO. Ill

1.

DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BOX
ELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF
A DEBTOR?
"YES"
"NO"

Explanation:

The tort of "abuse of process" is present when

a person pretends to be using legal use of process for a purpose
but intentionally use it for a different purpose or to inflict
unnecessary stress or pain.

An example may be when a creditor

refuses to remove a mortgage or . lien in an attempt to force a
payment on a different debt.

The plaintiff alleges that the

defendant's employees and/or lawyer has done that in this case.
The defendant denied this and asserts they made an honest mistake.
The issue is submitted to the jury.
The distinguishing between a "malicious breach of contract"
and "abuse of process" generally is that the "abuse of process"
that involves the use of court process where an intentional
breach of contract may or may not involve an abuse of process.
If the plaintiff proves an abuse of process the law permits the
award of punitive damages.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff on this issue.
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INTERROGATORY NO. IV
1.

IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED INTERROGATORY 2 or 3 "YES", WHAT
SUM, IF ANY, DO FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED AS PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT AND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF?

AWARD
Explanation:

The plaintiff here alleges that the defendant

should be punished for an intentional wrong.

The defendant denies

not only the intentional wrong but also alleges that even if quilty
of a intentional wrong no punitive damages should be awarded.

This

issue is submitted to the jury.
If the jury finds a "YES" answer to Interrogatory 2 and/or 3
it can legally award punitive damages.
damages does not mandate that it do so.

The fact that it can award
The jury should award

punitive damages only for the purpose of punishing the defendant
and/or detering the company from acting in this matter in the
future and/or to deter similar action by others so situated.

The

jury may consider all matters logically bearing on this issue, which
might include, the motive present, the intended affect on the plaintiff,
the advantage hoped to be gained, and the presence of malice and **&
its degree.

'**•

If the jury awards punitive damages, in determining the amount
to be awarded, the jury should act with caution.

It may consider

the sum needed, if any, to deter the defendant for so acting in the
future or to deter others from so acting in the future or to punish
this particular defendant.
The jury may consider the wealth of the defendant in determining
the effect of an award.

The jury may also consider whether or not

the plaintiff is a proper person to receive such an award.

The ce*?*t d

may consider the plaintiff's innocence or intentional conduct in the
total matter.
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The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence:
1st.

That the defendant should be punished in this case, and

2nd.

The amount of punishment that should be inflicted, and

3rd.

That the plaintiff is a proper person to receive such an
award.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD H. VANDYKE,
SPECIAL
JURY VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

Civil No.

19389

ORIGINAL

Defendant

INTERROGATORY NO. I
WHAT SUM DO YOU FIND PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS COMPENSATION DAMAGES FOR THE DEFENDANT'S WRONGFUL ENTRY OF A
DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN SALT LAKE COUNTY AND/OR IN FILING OF
A JUDGMENT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY THAT LIENED THE PLAINTIFF'S
REAL PROPERTY?
0h

AWARDED

"}

•'

INTERROGATORY NO. II
DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S BREACH OF CONTRACT IN THE TAKING OF
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND/OR FILING THE JUDGMENT IN BOX
ELDER COUNTY WAS AN INTENTIONAL BREACH OF CONTRACT DONE
WITH MALICE OR TO GAIN AN UNLAWFUL ADVANTAGE OVER THE
PLAINTIFF?
"YES"

%,
N LI !Yl b G i'_—-^-*-"-4-"'

"NO"

FILED

JUL 1 1 19
-30-

By.

SPECIAL JURY VERDICT CONTINUED
INTERROGATORY NO. Ill
DO YOU FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
THAT THE DEFENDANT'S EMPLOYEES AND/OR LAWYER INTENTIONALLY
USED ILLEGALLY "ABUSED THE PROCESS" BY UNLAWFULLY FILING
OR ALLOWING AN INVALID JUDGMENT TO BE CONTINUED IN BQX^_jELDER COUNTY TO GAIN AN ILLEGAL CREDITORS ADVANTAGE OF^/A
DEBTOR?
"YES"

€

"NO"
INTERROGATORY NO. IV
IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED INTERROGATORY 2 or 3 "YES", WHAT
SUM, IF ANY, DO FIND IT PROVEN BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AWARDED AS PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT AND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF?

AWARD7,? 7 600 '

<r

DATED THIS 11th DAY OF JULY, 19 86

f,' '? /(');„.

FOREPERSON
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD H. VANDYKE,
)

JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs .

)

MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

H
)

Civil No. 19389

Defendant.

BE IT KNOWN that this matter having come on regularly

for

trial on the 10th day of July, 1986; and the Plaintiff having been
present in person and represented by counsel, Michael L. Miller;
and the Defendant having been present by and through its agent and
represented by counsel, Dennis K. Poole; and the court, the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist District Judge presiding, having
empaneled a jury; and the parties having thereafter presented
evidence to the jury; and the court having determined that as a
matter of law, certain issues were not in dispute; and the jury
thereafter having retired to deliberate the issues remaining in
dispute; and having so deliberated having returned a special
verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarding Plaintiff $250.00 in
damages for breech of contract and $37,000.00 in punitive damages
for intentional and malicious breech of contract and and for abuse
of process; and the court having ordered that judgment be entered

tfzxf- y.
on said special verdict, and that in said judgment, an offset be

given to Defendant for the sums due and owing Plaintiff on the
balance of the installment contract and the open account in the
amounts of $1493.98 and $775.93 respectively; now
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that
Plaintiff, RICHARD H. VANDYKE, be and is hereby awarded judgment
against the Defendant, MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,
as follows:
1. $34,980.09 in compensation and punitive damages;
2. $357.74 in costs;
3. Interest on the total judgment at the lawful rate from the
date hereof until collected and costs of the court hereinafter
accruing.
DATED this

h day
-y-

of

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT to Defendant's attorney,
postage prepaid, at:
DENNIS K. POOLE
Attorney at Law
Prowswood Plaza, Suite 306
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
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sel L. M i l l e r
ley at Law
Main
Box 399
3m City, Ut.

DATED t h i s gJ^J'H

day of

1986

723 1784

•34*a. •••* • -i

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD H. VAN DYKE,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
vs,
MOUNTAIN COIN MACHINE
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.,

Case No.

19389

Defendant.

The defendant has made a motion for a new trial and/or
in the alternative for a reduction in the punitive damage award.
The Court here denies those motions.
When the Court considers a motion such as the one before
it, it must not substitute
jury.

its own judgment for that of the

The Court is not particularly bothered by that rule in

this case, because the Court's own view is that there was good
reason to grant substantial punitive damages.

If the Court gives

due consideration to the jury's findings, it would find facts as
indicated below.
FACTS
1.
Elder County.

The plaintiff is a businessman in Brigham City, Box
He conducts a restaurant business there, and also

has a business that might be called an arcade, that is where
people play video games, etc.

The defendant is in the business

RLEL
MICROFILMED

W r f - ^ * ° " No. j ? ^
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of selling the coin machines to arcades.
interested

in a very

participated
aircraft.
ment

in

complicated

general

as

The plaintiff became

machine, wherein

though

he was

the player

the pilot

of an

Plaintiff and defendant eventually reached an agree-

and

entered

into

a

contract

wherein

plaintiff

was

to

purchase the machine and pay a sum of monies on an installment
basis for it.
2.
plaintiff's
should.

The

machine

premises.

was

The

delivered

machine

and

installed

performed

on tj)e

exactly

as

it

The difficulty was that for some reason the teenagers,

or customers, were not attracted to the machine in sufficient
numbers that the continued placement of the machine on plaintiff's premises was economically justified.

Plaintiff attempted

to force the defendant to accept the return of the machine.

The

defendant stood on its rights and refused delivery, and informed
the plaintiff that he would be held to the contract.
3.

The

defendant

subsidiary corporation.

transferred

the

contract

•

%

to

a

This corporation was a finance company.

In general the finance company took the position that it was a
bonafide purchase for value, and that they were not subject to
any defenses the plaintiff might assert in the nature of a right
to return

the machine.

This frustrated

the plaintiff.

The

general situation suggests that this set up had been engineered
in part to frustrate persons such as the plaintiff, or persons in
the plaintiff's position.
-36-
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4.

The defendant filed suit against the plaintiff on

the contract.

The parties eventually re-negotiated a settlement

that occurred between the plaintiff and one of the two corporations.

The payments were in part delinquent at times, but in

general were made pursuant to the contract.

The other corpora-

tion continued the suit and secured a default judgment in Salt
Lake County, in Murray Circuit Court.

This default was entered

by the defendant without the plaintiff's knowledge, and was a
complete surprise to the plaintiff, because it occurred after it
settled.
5.

Plaintiff contacted

the defendant corporation and

requested that they remove the judgment, inasmuch as the cause of
action under which the judgment was taken had been negotiated and
settled, and

that, therefore, the judgment was invalid.

The

judgment was filed in Box Elder County.
6.

Eventually the defendant caused the plaintiff to be

informed by an attorney that the judgment would not be removed
because the plaintiff owed a separate sum of money on an open
account to the defendant.
was

an

abuse

of

judgment removed.

The plaintiff took the view that this

process.

Plaintiff

to

have

the

It was terribly upsetting to him as he was

attempting to refinance his home.
dropped.

attempted

The general mortgage rates had

He believed he could not do so because of the existence

of a judgment against him.
respect failed.

His evidence

of damages in this

The bank indicated that they probably would have
-37-
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rewritten the plaintiff's contract at any time he desired them to
because

of

their

personal

acquaintance

and

respect

for

the

plaintiff, but that the rate of interest would not have dropped,
because

they were

charging

1% above

prime

on

all

commercial

transactions, and this would be regarded as such a loan.

The

jury likely determined that the judgment was left on the books
for a improper purpose, and that it was done deliberately a|td
knowingly by the attorney who served both corporations and t|^e
business heads for each company.
7.
judgment

The plaintiff employed an attorney who requested the

be removed.

He later charged the plaintiff

threaten suit if the judgment was not removed.

$250 to

After the threat

was made, time passed, and eventually the judgment was removed.
The plaintiff then filed this suit for abuse of process, to-wit:
the taking of an invalid judgment in Murray Circuit Court, and
the docketing of it in Box Elder County for an improper purpose
and the refusal to remove it for an improper purpose.
8.
$250.

•»

The jury awarded actual damages in the amount of

This is exactly the sum claimed as attorney's fees paid by

the plaintiff to his lawyer to threaten suit and get the judgment
removed.
9.
received.

Some evidence as to the wealth of the defendant was
The usual instructions on punitive damages were given.

10.

The jury then awarded $37,000 as and for punitive

damages as punishment against the parent company.
-38-
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ISSUE
There
discussions

are

that

many

there

Utah

decisions

should

in which

there

are

exist some relationship between

actual damages suffered and punitive damages awarded.

Some of

these judgments would suggest that punitive damages are excessive
when

they

suffered.

exceed

three

or

four

times

the

actual

damages

Most of the cases that take this approach are cases in

which there are no actual evidence as to the defendant's net
worth or as to its wealth.
which

shows

that

There is in this case an exhibit

the defendants were prepared

to acknowledge

during discovery that the net worth of the parent corporation was
at

least

one and

one-half

million

dollars.

The

plaintiff's

attorney argued the case to the jury; that the abuse of process
was obvious and clear; and done by corporation counsel of the two
corporations; and also with full knowledge of the heads of the
defendant

corporation.

support this argument.

There

is

circumstantial

evidence

to

Plaintiff's counsel further argued to the

jury that to award a few hundred or a few thousand dollars in
this case as punitive damages would serve no useful purpose.

The

company could absorb such losses painlessly and continue to do
this type of a practice

to enforce collection of debt.

The

attorney further argued that if the debtor's rights are to be
enforced at all in a case like this, there would have to be an
award of sufficient punitive damages that a debtor could afford
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to bring the lawsuit against them and also such a sum of money
that

it would

remove

the

profits which

a

corporation,

or

a

corporation with subsidiaries, might enjoy through misuse of this
collection device.
CONCLUSION
The Utah authorities, and the federal authorities, have
been faced with this type of an issue before.

These authorities

consider the wealth of the defendant, its motive, and the amount
of

judgment

which

would

be

necessary

to

remove

any

probable

profit from continuing the practice by defendant and others so
situated.

It is the plaintiff's position that a judgment in the

amount here awarded is appropriate for those purposes.
This particular
the Court has witnessed.
take

unjustified

litigation resembles other

litigations

At times creditors are in a position to

advantages

over

their

debtors.

There

are

penalties built into the Commercial Code intending to stop this
type of practice.

This particular action is not brought under

the Commercial Code.

It is brought appropriately under the tort

law for abuse of process.
should

and

measurement.

can

be

The amount of punitive damages, which

awarded,

is

not

capable

of

an

exact

In general, it would have to be a sufficient sum

that a defendant of this size, that does its business through
corporations, has

attorneys

on

retainer, etc., would

find

it

unprofitable to do this type of thing to debtors in the future.
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The Court has considered what sum would be proper.

It

has considered sums of $10,000, $25,000, and the $37,000 award.
The Court recognizes that this was deliberate misconduct
under the advise of an attorney.

done

The Court recognizes that the

defendant does a large retail business in its own name and an
undisclosed amount of business through subsidiary corporations.
The Court finds that it cannot, in its discretion, say that this
sum

is

animosity

excessive.

The

Court

among the jurors.

saw

no

evidence

of

anger

or

The Court notes that jurors did

include persons of business experience and sophistication.
Court finds that it must respect the jurors1 judgment.
DATED this £p\ ^day of September, 1986.

OHN F. WAHLQUIST, Judge

vJ

(
1/
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